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The WTO provides a forum for the resolution of disputes where recourse to unilateralism is discouraged. This does not only accrue form the provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which contain a strict and detailed procedure requiring resort to prior authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), but is complemented by Article 23 DSU, entitled “Strengthening the multilateral system”, which explicitly advocates the multilateral character of the system, emphasizes the strict adherence to the provisions of the DSU and anticipates problems at the operation of this procedure.​[1]​ A WTO Member, once availing itself of the provisions of the DSU in order to resolve an outstanding dispute with another WTO Member, undertakes to follow religiously the procedures enshrined therein. While the DSU, not immune from gaps and inefficiencies, could be interpreted to provide a complete set of rules,​[2]​ the two major trading partners within the WTO, namely the USA and the EC, have on several occasions stretched the interpretative boundaries of the DSU provisions and took, or threatened to take, a deviant path away from the DSU framework.​[3]​ From an EC perspective, autonomous measures of a unilateral character are gradually establishing themselves as essential arrows within the Union’s trade quiver so much so that recently practice demonstrates an inclination to adopt unilateral measures in anticipation of a WTO dispute rather than in the course of actual litigation.​[4]​ 

The remark made above instigates a broad discussion over the relationship between autonomous measures and international dispute settlement and in particular, the past, present and future of WTO Dispute Settlement. The broader repercussions to the relationship will be evinced by virtue of an analysis focussed on a particular case where autonomous measures have been adopted by the EC. The case in hand concerns the measures taken by the EC in order to respond to the non-compliance by the US with the unfavourable ruling delivered by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the dispute US - 1916 Anti-Dumping Act.​[5]​ In particular, the longstanding dispute concerns an EC complaint against the United States over the latter’s Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (the Act).​[6]​ Having exhausted all stages of the WTO Dispute Settlement system since the EC requested consultations in June 1998 and faced with delays in compliance by the US, the Council adopted Regulation 2238/2003 (the Regulation) in response.​[7]​ The Regulation is an autonomous measure adopted following the internal EC procedure. The DSB granted no authorization for this measure, nor has any authorization been requested. In this sense, the Regulation represents a unilateral measure taken in the margin of an ongoing WTO Dispute. In the analysis that follows its legality shall be assessed in the light of the overlapping frameworks established by the WTO and EC legal orders.

2.	The US – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act case

The 1916 Anti-dumping Act which forms the subject-matter of the Community’s complaint provided that 
“It shall be unlawful … to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such articles, …, : Provided, that such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States. Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanour, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. Any person … may sue … and shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”​[8]​ 
The EC considered that these provisions were incompatible with WTO law,​[9]​ and on 4 June 1998, the EC requested consultations with the US in respect of the latter’s alleged failure to repeal its Anti-Dumping Act of 1916.​[10]​ At the EC’s request a panel was established by the DSB on 1 February 1999.  In its report, circulated to Members on 31 March 2000,  the panel considered that the 1916 Act violated Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, Articles 1, 4 and 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. On the appeal by the US, the Appellate Body upheld all of the findings and conclusions of the panel that were appealed.​[11]​

After the adoption of the Appellate Body report and the Panel report by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the US stated that it was its intention to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings, it would however require a reasonable period of time for implementation and would consult with the EC and Japan on this matter.  The resulting arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU set the reasonable period of time in this case at 10 months, expiring on 26 July 2001, but was extended by the DSB until 31 December 2001 or the end of the current session of the US Congress, whichever earlier. On 7 January 2002, on the grounds that the US had failed to bring its measures into conformity within the reasonable period of time, the EC and Japan requested authorisation to suspend concessions pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. Both Members proposed that the suspension of concessions takes the form of an equivalent legislation to the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 against imports from the US. The US objected to the levels of suspension of obligations proposed by the EC and Japan and the matter was referred to arbitration, in accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU which was suspended during the parties’ efforts to find a mutually satisfactory solution.  





It could be argued on the basis of the chronological account analysed above that, despite any delays and shortcomings, the resolution of this dispute constitutes a triumph of multilateralism and of the WTO Dispute Settlement system in particular. This proposition could not be further from the truth. Faced with the protracted unwillingness of the US to conform with the rulings of the Panel and Appellate Body by repealing the Act or amending the WTO-inconsistent provisions thereof and despite the forthcoming authorization for countermeasures in the form of WTO-inconsistent anti-dumping legislation by the DSB, an additional line of defence was devised by the EC. Two months after it had reactivated the Article 22.6 arbitration and while arbitration was still pending, the EC considered that it would be more efficient to take additional measures against American industries involved in the American disputes against the European companies. Acting on the basis of Article 133 EC Treaty (Common Commercial Policy), the Council adopted the Regulation under scrutiny in this study.​[14]​ The objectives of the Regulation, enshrined in its preamble, are to coerce the United States of America to repeal the Act whose maintenance and application impedes the harmonious development of world trade,​[15]​ to protect persons under the jurisdiction of the Member States against whom claims under the Act are pending before US courts which are causing substantial litigation costs and may ultimately result in a judgment awarding treble damages,​[16]​ to protect the established legal order and the interests of the Community and of natural or legal persons exercising rights under the Treaty,​[17]​ and, under these exceptional circumstances, to do so by removing, neutralising, blocking or otherwise counteracting the effects of the Act.​[18]​

In order to achieve these objectives two measures are promulgated in the Regulation: a negative (‘the blocking provision’) and a positive measure (‘the clawback provision’). The blocking provision prohibits the recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions by administrative or judicial authorities rendered in the US giving effect to the Act.​[19]​ The clawback provision grants the affected Community industries the right to recover any outlays, costs, damages and miscellaneous expenses as a result of the application of the Act.​[20]​ Recovery may be obtained from any person or entity that brought the claim under the Act.​[21]​ Recovery may take the form of seizure and sale of assets held by the defendant, including shares in a legal person incorporated in the Community.​[22]​

It is not the first time that such measures have been taken in international relations. The origin of the blocking provision can be traced in the US anti-boycott regulations adopted in response to the Arab boycott of Israel. The US anti-boycott regulations however did not contain any clawback provisions for the compensation of those firms penalised by the boycotting countries.​[23]​ The first instance when the clawback provision has been noted was the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980.​[24]​ The UK Act had been adopted so as to counteract the multiple damages awarded by US Courts in anti-trust cases and provide for the recovery of the damages actually suffered.​[25]​ In the EC legal framework, the first attempt to adopt such a legal instrument took place in 1982 when the US Government prohibited the Community to use US technology at the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. The Community then made a formal ‘démarche’ complaining against the US but no countermeasures were taken at a Community level.​[26]​ 

The first successful use of these provisions by the Community took place in 1996, when, in the course of another WTO dispute, the Helms-Burton Regulation was adopted ​[27]​ in order to counteract the effects of the notorious Helms-Burton Act.​[28]​ The Helms-Burton Regulation’s provisions are essentially reproduced by the 2003 Regulation.​[29]​ It should be mentioned here that the Community was not alone in adopting measures as Canada and Mexico had also put similar legislation in place for the same reason.​[30]​ It should be admitted however, that neither the Community nor any other party attracted serious criticism for the adopted measures owing to the furore caused by the adoption of the extraterritorial measures by the US which, in the opinion of several commentators, were also fundamentally misguided on a political level.​[31]​ In addition, the Regulation was hardly put to the test due to the continuous suspension of the application of the Helms-Burton Act.​[32]​

Having been adopted in the context of an ongoing WTO dispute, having Article 133 EC as its legal basis and having the content analysed above, the Regulation raises several questions which go further than the discourse on multilateralism within the legal framework established by the WTO. In fact, the first question to be asked is whether the Regulation is consistent with Community law. The answer is dependent on the choice of Article 133 as the legal basis for its adoption, the Regulation’s content and the context within which the measures enshrined in the Regulation were adopted, namely the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR).​[33]​ The second question is the legality of the Regulation in WTO law. Accordingly, their legality shall be also assessed under the WTO rules and in particular those enshrined in the WTO DSU. The analysis of the conformity of the Regulation with WTO law, apart from its standalone merit, affects the answer to the question of legality in Community law since the TBR explicitly sets the multilateral trading rules, and in particular those of the WTO, as the Community’s normative benchmark. As a consequence, the Regulation’s legality in Community law shall also be affected by the conclusion drawn regarding its legality under WTO law.

4.	Analysis of the Regulation’s legality under Community law

As mentioned above, the Regulation is based on Article 133 EC Treaty. Article 133 contains the rules for the exercise by the Union of its Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and represents the basic source of authority for the EC to conduct of its external trade relations. As such it represents the mechanism which enables EC to assert its rights on the international trading plane and, most notably, participate in the WTO Dispute Settlement system. The first question to be answered therefore is whether the Regulation is validly based on Article 133. The answer forms part of broader considerations on the nature and scope of the CCP and the measures that can be taken in its application. Conflicting considerations include the Columbus egg dilemma which ponders over whether a measure taken in the course of an ongoing WTO dispute is a Commercial Policy measure its content regardless or whether the content of the measure will determine its nature as a commercial policy measure. The question of the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), enshrined in Article 133 EC Treaty, has been central in the seminal Opinion 1/94​[34]​ and the Treaty amendments in Amsterdam, Nice and the Constitutional Treaty. As is well known, the Common Commercial Policy can be implemented by both the conclusion of international agreements and the adoption of autonomous measures.​[35]​ Article 133 can form the legal basis for both. While contractual and autonomous Commercial Policy run in parallel, a gradual deviation from the principle of parallelism has been noted since the Treaty of Amsterdam amendments. While the scope of the CCP was extended to cover negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on services and IP, the adoption of internal measures on the same subject-matter was still based on the appropriate internal legal bases.​[36]​ The question on the scope of the CCP in the case-law was primarily concerned with the scope of Article 133 for the purposes of the conclusion of international agreements.​[37]​ 





The theoretical underpinnings the debate have been divided into an instrumentalist and an objective approach.​[38]​ The former makes the choice of the legal basis for a measure dependent on its function and the latter on its aim. A lot could be said about the conflict but it is obvious in the post-Opinion 1/94 case-law that the Court tends to favour the objective approach. In connection with this statement the following question arises: do the measures contained in the Regulation belong to the Common Commercial Policy only because they relate to an international trade dispute or should their content determine the nature of the measures and accordingly, their potential legal basis? The issue of the nature of the measures is not unrelated to the issue of interpretation of the exclusivity of Community competence in relation to the competence of the Member States. A distinction should be drawn here between exclusivity of the CCP for the conclusion of international agreements and the adoption of internal measures. While Member States are precluded from concluding international agreements with third countries as those may affect the internal market, they are not precluded from adopting internal measures affecting international trade to the extent which they are allowed to do so in the internal market context. For example, Member States enjoy the competence to enact domestic rules imposing restrictions on goods originating in other Member States insofar as these rules protect the public interest requirements of Article 30 EC Treaty.​[39]​ Those national rules would have been rendered meaningless had Member States not been allowed to impose the same restrictions on goods originating in third countries.​[40]​ Had the instrumentalist approach been favoured by the Court, Member States would have been precluded to adopt these measures as they affect international trade. The exclusivity of Community competence only ensues in the internal market when the field is exhaustively regulated by common rules. As far as the contractual action of the Community is concerned, this is assumed a priori.​[41]​ 

With the above in mind, an examination of Article 133 as the legal basis for the Regulation must be examined. The Court of Justice has been persistent in its case-law that the “legal basis shall be adopted on the basis of objective factors amenable to judicial review”.​[42]​ With regard to the CCP, the Court has consistently held that the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in their choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy.​[43]​ In 1987, analysing the instruments of Common Commercial Policy, Bourgeois wrote “Import duties, surveillance, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and quantitative restrictions imposed as protective measures may not always be appropriate or even possible. To further the common commercial policy interest, other actions and measures may be necessary. Legislation should be adopted under Article 113, e.g. to protect the commercial policy interests against boycott and against other actions by third countries, or act against trade in counterfeit goods”.​[44]​ This proposition must have been, in all probability, the starting point of the Commission’s reasoning favouring the adoption of such a measure on the basis of Article 133. 

The Commission has many reasons for choosing Article 133 as the legal basis and would certainly be supportive of Bourgeois’s proposition: First, the effectiveness of Community action at the handling the US – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act dispute is a fundamental consideration. Effectiveness could be facilitated if the Union’s response to the United States’ unwillingness to comply with the DSB rulings is informed by the same people and procedures and, more importantly, under exclusive Community competence, under qualified majority and without the involvement of the European Parliament. Second, closely linked to effectiveness is the uniformity of external trade action which in the case of the common commercial policy is safeguarded as it flows directly from the text of the Treaty. It has been acknowledged by the Court​[45]​ and supported by the Commission. The basic consideration behind the principle of parallelism and the principle of exclusivity with regard to the internal powers doctrine was to safeguard the principle of uniformity and the armouring of the Single Market by providing the same site of decision-making, meaning that the EC should legislate with regard to the same subject matter internally and externally.

However, both effectiveness and uniformity as grounds for resort to Article 133 should be examined against the historical evolution of the CCP. Constitutionally, the Union has made strides since the 70s. The narrow scope of the EC Treaty coupled with the broad interpretation of Article 133 by the Court of Justice in the 70s afforded the perception of Article 133 as a broad and all-encompassing legal basis for external economic activity.​[46]​ Since then, the failure of the Commission to achieve a formal recognition of this in the successive Treaty amendments in juncto with the broadening of the scope of the Treaties that those amendments brought rendered Article 133 EC untenable as a general external relations legal basis. The Constitutional Treaty seems to change little in this process except for the fact that the CCP is granted a broader scope and competence conferred by virtue of its provisions is exclusive to the Union for all aspects of trade including services, IP and investment. Regarding uniformity, it has been witnessed in the development of the case-law, reflected in the constitutional development of the Union and has been pointed out by commentators,​[47]​ uniformity is not critical for the effective operation of the internal market. 

Another argument for resort to Article 133 as the legal basis, is that indeed the Regulation is an unfair trade instrument.​[48]​ Is Regulation 2238/2003 a commercial defence instrument? A literal interpretation of Article 133(1) indicates that it could be. The reference to “measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies” permits an interpretation which extends the choice of commercial defence instruments not only to the traditional anti-dumping and anti-subsidies duties but also any other measure which is taken in order to protect trade. Traditionally, however, it has been anti-dumping and countervailing duties and safeguards which were considered falling within the commercial defence instrument term to such a degree that commentators suggested that it covers only those.​[49]​ The same conclusion may be drawn should the Regulation be examined in the light of the rules governing commercial defence instrument within the multilateral trading system. Indeed, the Annexes to the WTO Agreement provide a restrictive list of mechanisms in order to protect trade and those include the Anti-dumping, Anti-subsidies and Safeguard Agreements. 

An additional argument in favour of Article 133 as the legal basis would advocate that because of the “open nature” of the CCP,​[50]​ autonomous measures may be taken by the Community even if their subject matter is covered by other provisions of the Treaty.​[51]​ This has been the case for trade measures taken in the field of development cooperation​[52]​  or trade measures with foreign policy implications.​[53]​ Even if it were to be accepted that the Regulation concerns trade, the insertion of Articles 301 and 181a in the EC Treaty puts the above propositions in doubt.

The content of the Regulation as such could hardly be characterised as a commercial policy measure. Viewed outside their context, the blocking provision whereby the EC prohibits the recognition and enforcement of judgments by US courts is a private international law matter. The clawback provision granting a remedy to affected European companies enabling them to obtain damages by having recourse to the assets of US companies held in the Community territory is more difficult to characterise.​[54]​ While it has obvious repercussions to the operation of the internal market there is considerable difficulty basing it on the narrow provision of Article 133(1).

The choice of legal basis created difficulties in the Helms-Burton case too.​[55]​ The Helms-Burton Regulation was complemented by a Joint Action under the CFSP​[56]​ in order to ensure that the Member States take the necessary measures to protect those natural or legal persons whose interests are affected by the aforementioned laws and actions based thereon, insofar as those interests are not protected by this Regulation.​[57]​ The Regulation is based on ex Articles 73c, 113 and 235 EC Treaty.​[58]​ At the choice of legal basis the Council examined several options but it was clear at the outset that the measures proposed went far beyond the common commercial policy and the use of Article 133 as the sole legal basis was readily dismissed.​[59]​ It was thought that it had broader policy considerations and its main objective was to secure the operation of the common market.​[60]​ In the context of the Helms-Burton Regulation, the Council also considered its adoption on the basis of Article 301 EC Treaty. This was rejected in the Council as the Helms-Burton regulation was not aimed at interrupting economic relations with the United States.​[61]​ In the case of the Regulation at stake, Member States in the Council wishing to minimise anything stemming for the Helms-Burton Regulation model destined to cause controversy, have slashed anything in the Regulation perceived as a potential source of problem. This included the need for Joint Action under Title V and all other legal bases under the EC Treaty. Some substantive provisions have also fallen victim of this race to the bottom in the Council. 

The only defence for Article 133 as the chosen legal basis is that this is a measure taken against an anti-dumping measure taken by another state. Indeed, contrary to the US contentions, the Act has been found to be an anti-dumping measure. As such, measures taken against it should be considered as commercial policy measures. This approach tends to favour the instrumentalist approach and does not sit comfortably with the Court’s case-law on the matter.

Should Article 133 be considered as an inappropriate legal basis for the adoption of such measures what would the correct legal basis be? Regarding the blocking provision, it should be recalled that in the aftermath of the Treaty of Amsterdam amendments the Community was granted competence in the field of Justice and Home Affairs including the recognition and enforcement of judgments. To this end, the Community has adopted Council Regulation 44/2001 (the Brussels Regulation).​[62]​ The adoption of the Brussels Regulations lay down common rules internally, in the AETR sense,​[63]​ and empowers the Community to act externally in the field occupied by those rules. It is not clear whether this competence is exclusive but there is a request currently pending in the Court of Justice for an Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) on whether the Community has exclusive competence to conclude the Lugano Convention, which is a parallel Convention to the 1968 Brussels Convention.​[64]​ It should be relatively difficult to argue that the Community enjoys exclusive competence at the conclusion of the Lugano Convention, at least not for the whole subject-matter of the Convention, but it is difficult to surmise the terms in which the Court is expected to phrase its Opinion.

Be that as it may, it can be argued that the Community has competence in the field of recognition and enforcement of judgments and therefore, the blocking provisions should be adopted having Articles 61(c) and 67(1) EC Treaty as its legal basis. Those provisions are at disadvantage compared to Article 133 as they do not serve the interests of effectiveness and uniformity equally well. In particular, their choice would require unanimity in the Council which may complicate the achievement of an agreement, the competence over the subject matter is shared with the Member States while it requires the participation of the European Parliament in the process. Further, issues of the functioning of internal market would arise, as Denmark is excluded from the application of Title IV EC Treaty. The importance of the exception of Denmark from the application of the Brussels Regulation​[65]​ could hardly be understated. This is illustrated by current practice in the field of Justice and Home Affairs and the exclusion of Denmark from the application of international agreements concluded in the field of Title IV.​[66]​ There are no companies involved in the US proceedings which, in the knowledge of the author, are established in Denmark. In terms of principle however, the choice of 61(c) and 67(1) as the legal basis would give a competitive disadvantage to the Danish companies and affect the functioning of the internal market. On the issue of exclusivity, the importance of the choice of correct legal basis does not only serve the inter-institutional balance but also the special derogations afforded to specific Member States. This issue is of importance in the future construction of the European Union as a multi-speed Europe. If exclusivity represented a formula enabling the Community to function effectively on the international place and at the same time protect the uniform operation of the internal market, the reason for its maintenance seems to have been rendered obsolete by the prevailing trend of differentiation. Practice so far under Justice and Home Affairs has taken into account the special position of Denmark. It is interesting to see that the special position is important only insofar as it extends to the issue of competence and the validity of the obligation as such. Simply put, in the recent agreement on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation concluded between the European Community and Hong Kong,​[67]​ there is a joint declaration annexed to the text of the agreement providing “The Contracting Parties take not that this Agreement does not apply to the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. In such circumstances it is appropriate that the Hong Kong SAR and Denmark conclude a readmission agreement in the same terms as this Agreement.”​[68]​ There are several questions which are raised by this declaration. Although the preamble to Council decision concluding the Agreement refers to the special position of the Denmark and the fact that Denmark is neither bound by this decision nor subject to its application, it is clear that the legal soundness is subordinated to the effectiveness of the application of the Agreement with Hong Kong in the Community. Therefore, by virtue of the Decision taken in Denmark’s formal absentia there is a political obligation imposed on it to conclude a readmission agreement with Hong Kong and to frame this agreement “in the same terms” as the one concluded by the Community. With reference to the current analysis, this example offers little comfort to the fact that the special position of Denmark has the following ramifications if the Regulation was adopted under Articles 61(c) and 67(1) EC Treaty. If this were the case, the Regulation would exclude Denmark from its application and accordingly, a judgment recognised in Denmark could be automatically enforced in all other Member States under the Brussels Convention which applies between Denmark and the other Member States with regard to recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. However, were the Regulation to be adopted under Article 61(c) and 67(1), Denmark could deny the recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered thereunder on grounds of public policy.​[69]​ Despite potential problems evident in the above analysis, Articles 61(c) and 67(1) constitute the appropriate legal basis for the blocking measure. 





The basic problems the content of the Regulation raises in Community law are the extraterritorial reach of its provisions and the creation of rights for private parties with unwarranted basis on either international or Community law. In addition, even if Article 133 is considered as the correct legal basis, the measures run counter to the objectives of the Common Commercial Policy which are the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers.​[74]​

The means chosen in the Regulation contain a clear element of extraterritoriality. While there is no obligation incumbent of either the Community or the Member States to recognise judgments rendered by US courts, this is what normally happens on grounds of international comity. While the Brussels Regulation provides for exceptions to the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by the courts of the Member States on grounds of public policy,​[75]​ the concept does not have a uniform interpretation in different Member States. Assuming that what the Regulation does is to harmonise the concept of public policy there are two possible side-effects. First, assuming that the Community has the competence to harmonise the principle of public policy in so far as it concerns the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments this harmonisation should only take place under the appropriate legal bases, Articles 61(c) and 67(1) EC Treaty. Meanwhile, the threshold for public policy in Community private international law is set very low. When the courts of other WTO members apply WTO-inconsistent rules their judgments shall not be recognised in Community law. In addition, when these judgments impose financial penalties or fines the affected Community industries shall be entitled to compensation. This, apart from de facto ousting the jurisdiction of the US courts to apply their laws, it pre-empts their jurisdiction to hear claims for damages suffered by the EU companies. The relationship between the Courts of the Member States and the US Courts then becomes problematic as can be seen in the context of anti-trust litigation. For example, in the famous Laker Airways litigation, in Laker’s appeal in the House of Lords against a decision based on the 1980 Protection of Trading Interests Act, whose terms the Regulation mirrors, the House of Lords held that English Courts had no power to block the exercise of judicial power by the US Courts as long as the US Courts had jurisdiction.​[76]​ 

The creation of rights for individuals is equally problematic with regard to the direct effect of WTO law. As is well known, the Court of Justice has consistently held that WTO rules are not capable of conferring rights on individuals.​[77]​ Similarly to the EC legal order, WTO law does not grant rights to individuals from the point of view of the US legal order. Bearing in mind that the breach of WTO rules is the source of the Community action, the Regulation establishes an, otherwise non-existent, link between WTO rules and individuals. In connection with the discussion on extraterritoriality, the Council creates WTO-based rights in a foreign legal order at the same time as it denies those rights in the EC legal order.​[78]​ 





Moving on to the examination of the measure in its context, it should be pointed out that the Regulation was adopted in the course of an important WTO dispute initiated under the Trade Barriers Regulation, the commercial policy instrument specifically adopted in order to allow the Community to avail itself of the provisions of the multilateral trading system and in particular, the WTO DSU.​[82]​ It is designed to exert the Community’s rights and to remove the barriers to trade set by other WTO members. In fact, US – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act case has been initiated on the basis of a complaint brought by EUROFER, a company subject to proceedings under the Act.​[83]​

The examination of the context in which the Regulation was adopted offers a useful nexus for the scrutiny of the Regulation. First, the context may be a factor determinative for the choice of the legal basis. Second, the context sets the procedural parameters which the Regulation needs to observe. Third, it provides an additional gateway which necessitates the scrutiny of the Regulation’s provisions against the multilateral trading rules. 

The Court held in Opinion 2/00 ‘… the Protocol is, in the light of its context, its aim and its content, an instrument intended essentially to improve biosafety and not to promote, facilitate or govern trade.​[84]​ The mention of the term “context” is a novel factor for the determination of the legal basis of a measure. Since the context within which the Regulation has been adopted is the WTO Dispute Settlement System externally and the Trade Barriers Regulation internally, it offers significant support to justify the choice of Article 133 as the legal basis for the Regulation. However, because of the content of the measure analysed above, it is unlikely that the context of the TBR sufficiently tilts the balance in favour of Article 133 as the correct legal basis.

The soundness of this proposition should be examined in the light of an analysis of the relevant provisions of the TBR. Article 1 of the TBR provides:
“This Regulation establishes Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization which, subject to compliance with existing international obligations and procedures,​[85]​ are aimed at:
(a) responding to obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market of the Community, with a view to removing the injury resulting therefrom; 
(b) responding to obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market of a third country, with a view to removing the adverse trade effects resulting therefrom.
These procedures shall be applied in particular to the initiation and subsequent conduct and termination of international dispute settlement procedures in the area of common commercial policy.”
It is clear that when the Community is faced with barriers to market access abroad it can avail itself of the relevant dispute settlement procedures. 
 
It is further obvious that the Community bound itself to follow those procedures at the exercise of its international trade rights but “subject to compliance with existing obligations and procedures”. This entails both a procedural and a substantive obligation for the Community. While the adoption of the TBR is without prejudice to the right of the Commission to initiate WTO proceedings under the traditional procedure of Article 133, it should none the less submitted that when the Community initiates a dispute under the TBR within the WTO it is bound to follow the procedural rules contained therein. Second, at its conduct, it is necessary to observe the substantive international trade law obligations unless authorisation to do so is granted by the DSB under the suspension of concessions or other obligations procedure. In order to conform to these requirements, Article 12 TBR, entitled “Adoption of commercial policy measures”, provides:
1. Where it is found (as a result of the examination procedure, unless the factual and legal situation is such that an examination procedure may not be required) that action is necessary in the interests of the Community in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, with a view to removing the injury or the adverse trade effects resulting from obstacles to trade adopted or maintained by third countries, the appropriate measures shall be determined in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 13.
2. Where the Community's international obligations require the prior discharge of an international procedure for consultation or for the settlement of disputes, the measures referred to in paragraph 3 shall only be decided on after that procedure has been terminated, and taking account of the results of the procedure. In particular, where the Community has requested an international dispute settlement body to indicate and authorize the measures which are appropriate for the implementation of the results of an international dispute settlement procedure, the Community commercial policy measures which may be needed in consequence of such authorization shall be in accordance with the recommendation of such international dispute settlement body.
3. Any commercial policy measures may be taken which are compatible with existing international obligations and procedures, notably:​[86]​
(a) suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting from commercial policy negotiations; 
(b) the raising of existing customs duties or the introduction of any other charge on imports; 
(c) the introduction of quantitative restrictions or any other measures modifying import or export conditions or otherwise affecting trade with the third country concerned.
4. The corresponding decisions shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Publication shall also be deemed to constitute notification to the countries and parties primarily concerned.
It is clear from Article 12 of the TBR that the measure that can be taken by the Community in response to illicit commercial practices abroad are those specified in paragraph 3 namely, suspension or withdrawal of concessions, raising of customs duties or the introduction of quantitative restrictions. Those can only be taken only after the discharge of international dispute settlement procedures and in accordance with the recommendation of the dispute settlement body. The substantive legal obligation should be considered as binding on the Community irrespective of the route chosen for the initiation of the dispute. In this case, even if the dispute was initiated under the Article 133 EC Treaty route, the substantive legal obligations contained in the TBR should still be binding on the Community. The adoption of the Regulation therefore, is in violation of the TBR prima facie since it is not included in the list of consistent with the TBR actions that can be taken in the context of a WTO dispute.
  
In addition, the duty to provide reasons enshrined in Article 12(4) TBR is a restatement of the general duty enshrined in Article 253 EC Treaty. The reasons provided in the preamble to Regulation are the Community interests towards the harmonious development of world trade,​[87]​ the protection of persons under the jurisdiction of the Member States against substantial litigation costs and the possibility of a judgment awarding treble damages,​[88]​ the established legal order and the interests of natural and legal persons exercising rights under the Treaty,​[89]​ and the need to protect the interests of natural and legal persons under the jurisdiction of the Member States.​[90]​ It should be stated that behind the grandiose language used in the Preamble of the Regulation it is difficult to identify the reasons, while a retaliation procedure is pending under the WTO Dispute Settlement, for the adoption of the measures. Neither the rights of the Community industry can be identified especially since no judgment on the basis of the Act has been rendered in the US courts against EC companies.​[91]​ Neither is, it can be argued, in the Community interest, as required by the TBR’s preamble, to take these measures.

Finally, the Regulation may violate Community law and, in particular, the TBR, should it be found to be inconsistent with the multilateral trading rules to which the TBR clearly refers. According to the Fediol judgment, the WTO norms become the standard of review in the present case.​[92]​ This is the so-called clear reference exception and in this particular case makes the legality of the Regulation with Community law dependent on its legality in WTO law. For this purpose, the analysis of its legality with WTO law follows.

5.	Analysis of the Regulation’s legality under WTO law

The United States attempted to challenge the Regulation in the course of the Article 22.6 Arbitration.​[93]​ They claimed that the existence of the Regulation reveals that litigation costs are excluded from the amount of nullification or impairment suffered by the EC and that any amount of nullification or impairment awarded to the EC under that arbitration should be reduced by the amount the Regulation reduces nullification or impairment.​[94]​ The arbitrators decided that the Regulation fell outside the Panel’s terms of reference and invited the US to have recourse to the appropriate dispute settlement procedures if the Regulation results in a situation where the suspension of the obligations exceeds the level of nullification or impairment.​[95]​ The Regulation remains unchallenged to date.

Moving on to the analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the discussion, it should be accepted that any unilateral action outside the DSU especially after its provisions have been invoked would result in a violation of Articles 3(1)​[96]​ and 23​[97]​ DSU.​[98]​ In fact, this was the basis for the complaint brought by the EC against the US – Section 301.​[99]​ The Community brought this dispute against the US at a time where the latter was flexing its muscle against the former’s reluctance to comply with the Panel and Appellate Body ruling in the Bananas case.​[100]​ In this manner the Community attempted to pre-empt any unilateral retaliation from the US under Sections 301-310 of the 1974 Trade Act.​[101]​ The US claimed that the US Trade Representative enjoyed wide discretion at the administration of Section 301 consistently with the WTO DSU and in particular Article 23(2)(a) in accordance with the US Statement of Administrative Action.​[102]​ Consequently, the Panel found that Sections 301-310 of the 1974 Act are not inconsistent with Article 23 DSU subject to the undertaking offered by the US.​[103]​ 

Unilateral action has been undertaken by the US in the context of the Bananas dispute. While the Articles 21(5) and 22(6) panels were deliberating and in order to prepare for the imposition of additional tariffs on products originating in the EC by 19 April 1999, the US adopted the measures against the targeting products and imposed them with retroactive effect. The Community immediately requested the establishment of a Panel to assess whether this was a breach of WTO law.​[104]​ The Panel held that “First, no WTO violation can justify a unilateral retaliatory measure by another Member; this is the object of the prohibitions contained in Article 23.1 of the DSU.  If Members disagree as to whether a WTO violation has occurred, the only remedy available is to initiate a DSU/WTO dispute process and obtain a WTO determination that such a WTO violation has occurred.  Secondly, as noted by the Panel in US – Section 301, most of the time-limits in the DSU are either minimum time-limits without ceilings or maximum time-limits that are, nonetheless, indicative only.  … Delays in dispute settlement procedures can always happen.  The fundamental obligation of Article 23 of the DSU would be a farce if every time there is a delay in a panel or arbitration process, the unsatisfied Member could simply unilaterally determine that a violation has occurred and unilaterally impose any remedy.  We reject, therefore, this US defence.”​[105]​ The Appellate Body reversed this finding on the procedural ground that such a determination escaped the Panel’s terms of reference but it confirmed the fact that Article 23 DSU concerns the prohibition of unilateral action.​[106]​

It is not difficult to draw a parallel between the US attitude in the Bananas dispute and the EC attitude with regard to the Act. While, in that case, the United States prepared itself in winter 1998 to take certain measures which consisted of consistent with the WTO rules retaliatory measures (subject, of course, to authorisation by the DSB), the Community was blaming the US for unilateralism.​[107]​ More importantly as Weiss puts it “The use of or threat of concurrent unilateral self-help approaches under domestic legislation,…, is also likely to call in question their legal obligation to proceed in good faith.”​[108]​ Weiss goes on to explain that “unilateral action … is the very antithesis of the WTO’s multilateral dispute settlement system”.​[109]​ While the former is based on domestic policy considerations, is subject to the dealings on the internal political and economic agenda, is unpredictable and determined by the interests of domestic influential groups with no regard to the international legal obligations, the WTO Dispute Settlement is rooted in multilateralism, predictability and security in the multilateral trading system.​[110]​ Unilateral action represents a step backwards in the evolution of the international trading system from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented one. Set against the US “carousel” legislation, the Regulation appears to be even more detrimental to the multilateral trading system. Comparatively speaking, while Section 301 provides for domestic measures in order to protect the US interests, the EU bound itself pursuant to the TBR to adopt “the commercial policy measures which may be needed in consequence of such authorisation shall be in accordance with the recommendation of such international dispute settlement body”.​[111]​ Even if an international dispute settlement procedure is not being invoked and action in the interests of the Community should prove necessary then the Community is bound by the TBR to suspend or withdraw concessions, raise tariffs or impose quotas.​[112]​ In the correct understanding of Article 23 only suspension or withdrawal of concessions may be taken as countermeasures for the violation of the WTO Agreement and this is subject to prior authorization by the DSB. Those considerations apply both to the blocking and the clawback provisions.

In fact, the EC attitude towards the concept of unilateralism in international trade relations is obvious. One of the examples is the “carousel” legislation adopted by the United States in the course of the Bananas dispute. In that case, the US Trade Representative was authorised to revise the retaliatory actions adopted under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and to revise the list of products, wholly or partially, by rotating the list of products subject to retaliation 120 days after their adoption and every 180 days thereafter.​[113]​ Despite the existence of a DSB authorisation to retaliate, the EC considered such behaviour unacceptable. In fact, in addition to the economic arguments made, the EC argued that “[It] considers that the US measure is in breach of the DSU since it mandates unilateral action without any prior multilateral control.”​[114]​ 

With reference to the clawback provision, there is additional guidance in the jurisprudence of the Panels and Appellate Body where similar measures have been tested. For instance, the United States had adopted the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (commonly known as Byrd Amendment) which provides for the distribution of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to the affected domestic producers for qualifying expenditure on an annual basis. ​[115]​ According to its terms, as “affected domestic producer” qualifies a company that was a petitioner or interested party in support of the petition with respect to which an anti-dumping duty or a countervailing duty order and as “qualifying expenditure” the expenditure[s] incurred after the issuance of the anti-dumping duty finding or order or countervailing duty order has been entered.​[116]​ The Panel and Appellate Body of the WTO found that the Byrd Amendment constitutes a non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy, contrary to Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 1994, Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Articles 32.1 and 32.5 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.​[117]​ The United States did not comply and, in accordance with the recent decision by the Arbitrator,​[118]​ the EC was granted authorisation to suspend its concessions under the covered agreements in order to offset the amounts paid to the affected US producers in the annual distribution of the CDSOA and which was calculated to reach the amount of $150 million per annum.​[119]​ There are certain parallels that can be drawn between the Byrd Amendment and the Regulation. Importantly, the reason for their adoption is to reimburse private parties whose interests have been affected by illicit commercial practices and the extent of the granted reimbursement usually exceeds the core of the damage suffered from those practices to include very broadly framed “qualifying expenditure” and legal expenses respectively. The difference is that while the Byrd Amendment was a measure taken against dumping and subsidies, the clawback provision could be deemed as an actionable subsidy itself within the meaning of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. Aware that this is a difficult argument to make, it is suggested that a broad interpretation of the requirement of “financial contribution” to include the artificial public law right created by the clawback provision be made. 





Behind the argument for exclusivity stemming from Article 133 EC Treaty lies the need for effectiveness of the Community participation on the international trading plane and the concern that the concurrent participation of Member States would risk compromising the commercial interests of the Community.​[122]​ It should be made clear by now that this argument has been defeated in the course of the constitutional development of the European Union. Member States have been extremely reluctant to relinquish competence in favour of the Union and practice so far has been successful under the hybrid regime established under mixity.​[123]​ In fact, the exclusivity in external action, so powerful in the 70s case-law of the Court of Justice, has been undermined not only by the expansion of specific legal bases for the conclusion of international agreements providing a specific role for Member States,​[124]​ but by the very tainting of the CCP, the formerly hardcore domain of exclusivity, with the term shared competence.​[125]​ With regard to this watered down CCP, it can be argued that the Regulation exceeds the outer boundaries, internal and external, of the CCP as those are drawn by the Community and WTO rules. With regard to the former, the adoption of the Regulation takes a maximalistic understanding of the CCP and sets it as the general external economic relations policy. In the history of the tormented provision of Article 133 EC Treaty, it is clear that neither the Court​[126]​ nor the Member States​[127]​ condoned the use of the CCP as an all-inclusive external economic relations policy and the ad hoc exception in this case does not represent a shift in direction. At the same time, a challenge in the WTO Dispute Settlement system would, in all probability, be upheld. The argument this study makes is that the Regulation exceeds both internal and external boundaries of the CCP, it constitutes an anomaly within the Community legal order and is susceptible to a challenge in the WTO Dispute Settlement system.

The formal legality of the Regulation regardless, the advisability of the adoption of those measures is questionable. Even if the claims of the Community industries are perfectly valid, the balance tips towards the non-adoption of this kind of measures. First, they sit uncomfortably with basic norms of the multilateral trading system and generally speaking, international law. They are tainted with extraterritoriality, they grant rights to European companies unfounded in law and they open the Community to criticism. This is particularly so because of the timing, content and context of the measures. Since a WTO dispute has been initiated by the Community in the course of which the Community was authorised to suspend obligations under the covered agreements the Community should not resort to unilateral action. This unilateral action undermines the procedure and its claim for nullification and impairment of benefits and its credibility within the multilateral trading system.

Can the Community afford leaving EU companies competing in the US and other markets without any protection from WTO-incompatible legislation? This invites a look at the intrinsic characteristics of the system and the public international law nature which excludes the immediate involvement of individuals.​[128]​ The WTO system is certainly imperfect but one should not dismiss its usefulness as a mechanism to coerce even the strongest political and economic players like the US to comply with its norms.​[129]​ It also facilitates the creation of level-playing field. After all, in the context of the 1916 Act it is clear that since the expiry of the deadline for implementation with the Panel and the Appellate Body rulings to date no treble damages have been imposed on any European companies.​[130]​ Since the Community has submitted itself to the WTO Dispute Settlement it should allow the protection of competitive opportunities that the system is designed to safeguard. The rights of the private parties should be exhausted at the possibility of judicial review of the Commission decision to initiate proceedings under the TBR.​[131]​ 

With a view to the future, several proposals can be made as far as the protection of the rights of private parties is concerned. One would be to introduce direct effect to the WTO rules. This should not be the preferred choice for reasons explained elsewhere.​[132]​ The most attractive option would be to adopt a WTO Understanding whereby Members are authorised to return part of the revenue generated from suspended concessions to the affected private parties. This is not without its problems, most importantly, the express overruling of the Byrd Amendment and the contravention to several provisions of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. It could nonetheless be resolved by means of an authoritative interpretation of those agreements by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council.​[133]​
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